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Note
Copyrighted Laws: Enabling and Preserving
Access to Incorporated Private Standards
James M. Sweeney*
In 1997, a north Texas nonprofit regional-information website posted the municipal building code laws of two nearby ru1
ral towns. The original drafter of those codes, a private code
developer, issued a copyright infringement cease and desist to
2
the website owner demanding removal of the laws. In response, the website operator filed suit seeking a noninfringement declaration, and the code developer filed a coun3
terclaim for copyright infringement. Both the district court and
a Fifth Circuit panel sided with the code developer upholding
4
its copyright infringement claim. On rehearing en banc, however, a deeply divided Fifth Circuit narrowly reversed for the
operator, holding that laws are in the public domain and not
5
subject to the exclusive control of a copyright holder. This sequence of holdings is troublesome. Over 120 years ago, the Su* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2006,
Minnesota State University Moorhead. I would like to extend gratitude to Professor Dan Gifford for furthering my knowledge of copyright law. A special
thank you to Hannah Nelson whose continual involvement helped polish the
many fragmented, wee-hour revisions into a fluid form. Thanks to the editors
and staffers of the Minnesota Law Review that contributed their time, specifically Robert Gallup, Maisie Baldwin, Joe Janochoski, and Karrah Johnston. I
want to recognize Professor Anne Alexander and Craig Garaas-Johnson for
their positive influence at key times long before the existence of this Note.
Lastly, I must express endless and humbled appreciation to my family and
friends for their many years of unconditional patience and understanding
while I learned to look at the world in a different way. For you. Copyright ©
2017 by James M. Sweeney.
1. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
2. See id. at 794.
3. See id.
4. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398 (5th Cir.
2001); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex.
1999).
5. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 793.
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preme Court held and later reaffirmed that copyright could not
6
be held in judicial opinions. Since then, courts have broadly
applied the precedent to all forms of laws, including statutes
7
and regulations. So why would this developer seek to enforce a
copyright infringement claim for publishing a statute, and be
successful in getting both a district court and an appellate
court to rule contrary to a universal precedent?
As a growing trend, private organizations create and volunteer to lawmakers thousands of model safety codes and industry standards (also known as voluntary consensus standards or Standards Developing Organization (SDO) standards),
which lawmakers enact as law through a process known as “in8
corporation by reference.” Incorporation by reference allows
lawmakers to give legal force to one of these standards by
merely publishing the name of the standard inside the body of
a law, instead of publishing the actual text of the entire standard. This results in thousands of statutes and regulations that
do not contain any content—just the name of a standard—yet
carry penalties for noncompliance as if the standard’s actual
contents were published inside the law. Members of the public
seeking to comply with the law must then obtain the standard
from the organization that authored it. The organizations assert copyright over their standards and typically charge the
9
public fees to access them. In some instances, the organizations file copyright infringement suits against anyone for publishing, printing, or distributing their standard that has been
6. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834) (“[N]o reporter . . . can
have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court . . . .”); see
also Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“The whole work done by
the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law,
which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all . . . .” (emphasis added)).
7. See, e.g., Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1898) (“[N]o one can
obtain the exclusive right to publish the laws of a state . . . .”); Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (“[T]his court holds that a
state may not copyright its statutes . . . .”).
8. Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737,
739 (2014) [hereinafter Mendelson, Private Control] (“The CFR today contains
nearly 9,500 . . . standards . . . .”); Nina A. Mendelson, Taking Public Access to
the Law Seriously: The Problem of Private Control over the Availability of Federal Standards, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10776, 10776 (2015) [hereinafter
Mendelson, Taking Public Access].
9. Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 743. In Veeck, the website
operator purchased copies of the law directly from the developer. 293 F.3d at
793.
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10

enacted into law. This practice is not a minor, infrequent occurrence; sales of these incorporated standards generate millions of dollars in revenue annually from members of the public
11
who simply need to know their legal obligations.
Concealing laws from the public and controlling access to
them with fees and threats of litigation raises significant due
process concerns. In the United States, ignorance of a statute
12
or regulation is not a defense to its violation. To remain consistent with that principle, Congress has promoted accessibility
and transparency to laws by establishing government printing
programs and freely distributing legal materials to local deposi13
tories and Internet websites. Also, throughout history the
government has taken action when affluence has been used as
14
a control to fundamental rights and necessities. Recognizing
that controlling access to laws runs contrary to these principles, there have been some attempts—without addressing copyright law—to make the copyrighted standards available to the
15
public. But these attempts have all generally failed for three
reasons. First, government reliance on private standards is systemic so they cannot simply be abandoned in favor of government-made alternatives. Second, incorporated standards are
not traditional laws, they are legitimate copyrighted works that
laws incorporate after copyright has been bestowed. Lastly,
lawmakers are thus barred from any action infringing the own-

10. See, e.g., Veeck, 293 F.3d at 794 (“SBCCI counterclaimed for copyright
infringement . . . .”); Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs. v. Code Tech., Inc.
(BOCA), 628 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1980) (“BOCA says it holds a copyright for
its [enacted code], which defendant CT has allegedly infringed.”); see also infra
note 218 and accompanying text (listing currently pending infringement litigation).
11. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the tax disclosures of some SDOs).
12. See United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563
(1971).
13. Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 764–66 (quoting H.R.
JOURNAL, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 328–29 (1795)) (“[M]ost conducive to the general
information of the people.”); see, e.g., U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF., https://www.gpo
.gov (last visited Nov. 24, 2016).
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (abolishing federal poll taxes);
see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding any
wealth-based electoral standard unconstitutional).
15. E.g., Pub. L. No. 113-30, 127 Stat. 510 (2013) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 60102(p)) (requiring an agency to only incorporate standards that are freely
available); Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,273–74 (Nov. 7,
2014) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 51) (categorically rejecting solutions to incorporation by reference that may have any negative implication on an organization’s copyright).
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er’s copyright, regardless of placement in any law. Since the
Copyright Code fails to expressly address the copyright of laws
or any work that possesses legal effect, an analysis of how existing copyright doctrines may be construed to enable free access to incorporated standards is due.
This Note argues that existing copyright doctrines do not
provide any solution for altering the copyrightability of incorporated standards, and under the current statutes the incorporated standards still maintain their copyright. To fully resolve
this problem, then, copyright revision is necessary to make the
legal obligations created by incorporation by reference freely
available to the public. Part I of this Note introduces voluntary
consensus standards and describes how they become enacted
into law. This Part also explains the copyright protections extended to both voluntary consensus standards and laws. Part II
examines how copyright cannot properly analyze copyrighted
works that subsequently become law in the same manner as
traditional laws, perpetuating the conflict. Part III argues for
two copyright law provisions that would make laws ineligible
for copyright and assign works with legal force to the public
domain.
I. VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS, LAWS, AND
HOW COPYRIGHT TREATS THEM DIFFERENTLY
Voluntary consensus standards are uniform rules created
by private nonprofit entities to promote safety, predictability,
and uniformity amongst industries and trades. Upon creation,
these standards receive copyright protection. Incorporation by
reference is a frequent lawmaking tactic that directly adopts
these standards into law, not by duplicating their copyrighted
contents word-for-word inside of the statute or regulation, but
16
by simply referring to the name of the standard. These mere
references force the public to seek out the standard from its developer, who generally charges a licensing fee to obtain it. Traditionally, access to laws (in any form) cannot be controlled by a
copyright holder. But the control asserted here is not over a
law—it is over a copyrighted work that a separate law requires
16. See Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an OpenGovernment Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134, 139–41 (2013) [hereinafter Bremer, Open Age] (discussing the benefits and ongoing emphasized
agency use of SDO standards); Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 505–06 (2013) (discussing saturation of agency selection).
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verbatim compliance with at risk of penalty. The Copyright
Code itself does not explicitly address the eligibility of works
that possess legal force. Thus, lawmakers cannot take any action that would infringe the copyright, nor is there any statutory method of removing the copyright. This sets up the issue at
hand: lawmakers are dependent upon private standards, which
upon adoption must remain under the exclusive control of their
authors. This forces the general public to either spend money to
comply or blindly risk violating regulations.
At the center of this conflict are two conceptually opposite
aspects of law. One is copyright—the grant of exclusive rights
17
to incentivize useful works. The other is open access—the due
process principle that laws must be freely accessible to the pub18
lic. The challenge to this issue is preserving both. This Part
summarizes these two conflicting concepts. Section A provides
an introduction to voluntary consensus standards and the logistics of how incorporation by reference gives some of them legal force. Section B explores how copyright applies to voluntary
consensus standards, which will be analyzed further in Part II.
Section C explains why laws cannot be subject to copyright.
A. VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND HOW THEY
RECEIVE LEGAL FORCE
The popularity of incorporation by reference among all levels of lawmaking is a direct response to the high quality of vol19
untary consensus standards. Subsection 1 outlines what voluntary consensus standards are and where they come from.
Subsection 2 explains how incorporation by reference gives
20
them legal effect in the context of federal regulations.

17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting “[e]xclusive rights in copyrighted
works”); see also infra Part I.B (further discussing applicable copyright provisions).
18. Even the most notorious, unforgiving lawmakers of antiquity did not
hide laws from the citizens subject to their punishments. See RONALD S.
STROUD, DRAKON’S LAW ON HOMICIDE 74 (1968) (noting the code of Drakon,
“which had been written on [public wooden tablets]”).
19. Some authors have called into question whether SDO standards are
really inherently valuable at all. See, e.g., Mendelson, Private Control, supra
note 8, at 761 (scrutinizing SDO internal process as not representative, unaccountable to authorities, and lacking transparency).
20. When examples or context is needed, this Note will use federal regulations as the level of lawmaking that employs incorporation by reference because of their national effect and near-total saturation of using voluntary consensus standards in lieu of any other type.
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1. Origin of Voluntary Consensus Standards
Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) are sophisticated private entities that develop and publish voluntary con21
sensus standards. The standards establish industry-wide uniform systems of safety or manufacturing, and cover a broad
range of daily life such as automobile lighting, exhaust sys22
tems, and the energy usage of an air conditioner. The dangers
of deviating from these standards are well documented and
tragic, often found in immense industrial explosions or struc23
tural collapses. Thus, industry-wide adoption of even a single
standard promotes quality, compatibility, and predictability in
the marketplace.
The network of SDOs in the United States is extensive.
SDOs are comprised of constituent “members” representing
many different industries and interests, such as government
professionals, corporate trade companies, and safety24
certification organizations. There are hundreds of SDO entities just in the United States, and each individual SDO can
25
have membership reaching thousands. These SDOs have a
prolific impact. There are more than one hundred thousand
voluntary consensus standards in use throughout the United
States and the largest SDOs have multi-million dollar revenue
streams from selling training products, annotated standards,
26
and certifications.

21. Strauss, supra note 16, at 499.
22. The Scope of Copyright Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 92 (2014) [hereinafter Scope Hearings] (statement of Carl Malamud, President, Public.Resource.Org).
23. Id. at 90 (statement of Carl Malamud, President, Public.Resource.Org). See generally John M. Broder, Panel Says Firms Knew of
Cement Flaws Before Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/10/29/us/29spill.html (noting cementing standards were ignored in
Deepwater Horizon disaster); Steven Greenhouse, BP To Pay Record Fine for
Refinery, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/
business/13bp.html (referencing safety code violations in 2005 Texas City refinery tragedy).
24. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 16, at 539–40 (discussing the membership makeup of the North American Energy Standards Board).
25. Id. at 500; see Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791,
793 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[C]onsisting of approximately 14,500 members
. . . .”).
26. Emily S. Bremer, A Multidimensional Problem, 45 ENVTL. L. REP.
10783, 10784 (2015) [hereinafter Bremer, Multidimensional]; see Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 94–95 (statement of Carl Malamud, President, Pub-
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Even though a voluntary consensus standard by itself does
not carry the force of a law, the process of developing a stand27
ard mirrors traditional lawmaking. SDO members are involved in an intricate process of writing, commenting, and
28
adoption of standards, sometimes taking up to five years to fi29
nalize. Since SDOs are private entities, they are not required
to disclose their exact development procedures and each SDO
30
has its own unique development process. For example, some
SDOs allow outside non-members to participate and others
31
may have traditional membership-only participation. The
careful vetting practice matched with each member’s expertise
creates high-quality standards.
2. How Voluntary Consensus Standards Become Law
For the past few decades, the federal government has increasingly relied on voluntary consensus standards in lawmaking. The first use began with the Reagan administration’s Circular A-119, which encouraged federal agencies to consider and
utilize voluntary consensus standards in their regulations and
32
rulemaking. In 1996 Congress went further and passed the
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA) requiring federal agencies to use voluntary consensus
standards in place of government-authored standards where
33
such usage was sufficient. Circular A-119 was then updated in
1998 to provide additional guidance to agencies for vetting the
lic.Resource.Org); infra Part III.C.2 (discussing SDO revenue reported on
Form 990 tax disclosures).
27. See OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8553–54 (Feb. 19, 1998)
(noting force of law comes from agency adoption into regulations).
28. Strauss, supra note 16, at 501; see also OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8546, 8554, § 4(a)(1) (1998) (listing characteristics common to SDO
standard development processes).
29. See Lydia DePillis, Should Legal Codes Be Copyrighted? Let’s Sue To
Find Out!, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2013), http://wpo.st/SxlJ1 (“Most of ASTM’s
standards are on a five-year development timeline . . . .”).
30. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 759 (“[F]ull public
access to SDO decisionmaking is limited . . . .”).
31. Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10778.
32. Strauss, supra note 16, at 504. See generally OMB Circular A-119, 63
Fed. Reg. 8546 (1998) (issuing White House directive to agencies regarding
revised procedure and guidelines for SDO standard use).
33. See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-113, § 12(a)(3), 110 Stat. 775, 782 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 272(b)(3) (2012)) (authorizing the Secretary of Commerce “to coordinate the
use by Federal agencies of private sector standards, emphasizing where possible the use of standards developed by private, consensus organizations”).
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34

development history of a standard before adopting it into law.
Since then, agencies have almost exclusively adopted SDO
standards in their rulemaking, in lieu of writing standards
35
themselves.
Federal law requires all binding agency regulations to be
36
published in the Federal Register. When the Federal Register
and Code of Federal Regulations began to swell in size, Congress sought to reduce page quantities by using a practice
37
known as incorporation by reference. Incorporation by reference creates an exception to the Federal Register publishing
mandate, allowing agencies to merely refer to SDO standards
38
by name in lieu of publishing the text of the standard. The only requirement for this publishing exemption is that the standard be made “reasonably available to the class of persons af39
fected.” “Reasonably available” simply means providing a
40
physical copy for inspection in Washington, D.C. Thus, if one
were to look up a regulation in the Federal Register that incorporated a voluntary consensus standard by reference, the text
of the standard would not be published despite being given full

34. Strauss, supra note 16, at 504–05; see also OMB Circular A-119, 63
Fed. Reg. 8546, 8554 (1998) (defining SDO processes that help satisfy agency
policy).
35. In a 2013 report for the preceding year, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology found only a single instance of an agency using a
government-developed standard in lieu of an SDO standard, in contrast to using 423 SDO standards, some of which even replaced older governmentdeveloped standards. Strauss, supra note 16 (citing NATHALIE RIOUX, NIST,
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF VOLUNTARY
CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 1 (2013)).
36. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012) (“Each agency shall separately state
and currently publish in the Federal Register.”).
37. Strauss, supra note 16, at 502.
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
39. Id.
40. Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10776–78; see also
Incorporation by Reference, 1 C.F.R. § 51.9(b)(4) (2015) (requiring a showing
that referenced standards are available for inspection); cf. Strauss, supra note
16, at 518–19 (suggesting Congress had a wider availability in mind for “reasonably available” than what is currently viewed as sufficient). Much debate
centers just on what amount of access is required to statutorily satisfy “reasonably available” in today’s digital age and to what extent the government
should be accountable for providing it. Compare, e.g., Bremer, Open Age, supra
note 16, at 156–59 (arguing access should be broad and agencies bear responsibility for ensuring availability), with Strauss, supra note 16, at 523–24 (arguing the Internet has eliminated the “space-saving rationale” of incorporation
by reference and created new access obligations for the Office of the Federal
Register).
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legal force as if it were. For example, the regulation that specifies the criteria for OSHA-compliant protective eyewear simply
states, “devices must comply with any of the following consen41
sus standards . . . .” That regulation then lists three different
42
standards, only by name, and provides no further information.
This means anyone wishing to see the standard must
search for it. The standards generally cannot be found on the
Internet or in government depositories, meaning the public
43
must obtain the standard from the SDO that authored it. The
SDOs often claim a copyright in the standard and charge a license fee to obtain a copy. In the instances where the SDO provides the standard with no charge, they still reserve the right
44
to limit access or begin charging a fee. The fees for the stand45
ards are arbitrarily set by the SDO. The fees may range in
amount, for example, from $91.50 for the Minnesota State Fire
46
Code to $6000 for a Medicare prescription drug standard. In
the context of the above OSHA regulation, the public must either pay $57 to comply with the law, or risk a $12,471 fine by
47
blindly going without it.
The government did not anticipate that SDOs would claim
copyright over the standards, but rather expected them to be
48
widely available in libraries or commercial publications. Despite this unexpected assertion of copyright, SDOs continue to
maintain this control because Circular A-119 directs agencies
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.133(b)(1) (2016).
42. Id. § 1910.133(b)(1)(i)–(iii).
43. See Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10776; Strauss,
supra note 16.
44. Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 753. Even in the instances where SDOs do provide “free” access, it is only under strict conditions within their exclusive control, and users accessing it must sign waivers for challenging the copyright claims. Id.
45. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 507 (“[T]he monopoly price a valid copyright would permit a private organization ‘owning’ that legal obligation to
charge.”).
46. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 744; INT’L CODE
COUNCIL, MINN. ST. FIRE CODE (2007), http://shop.iccsafe.org/minnesota-state
-fire-code.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). See generally MINN. R. 7511.0010–
7511.8440 (2016) (Minnesota State Fire Code Regulation).
47. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(3)–(4) (2016) (penalties for violation); ANSI
Webstore, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail
.aspx?sku=ANSI%2fISEA+Z87.1-2010+Package (last visited Nov. 24, 2016).
48. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 519 (citing S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 4–5
(1964)). The legislature anticipated commercial publishers would issue compilations of incorporated standards, thus making Federal Register printing redundant. See S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 4 (1964).
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49

to “observe and protect the rights of the copyright holder.”
This has multiple implications. First, it prevents agencies from
just publishing the contents of the standard for free, meaning
50
the public is forced to buy it from the SDOs. Second, it means
that all incorporated standards are voluntarily offered as candidates for incorporation by the owner organization, as opposed
51
to the agencies forcefully adopting them. Third, this means
current agency policy does not recognize a standard’s copyright,
52
nor its pricing, as a preclusion to incorporation.
Lastly, it means an incorporated standard that has even
been superseded and outdated by its own SDO still maintains
copyright respect as long as the regulation referencing it still
53
exists. This especially has a wide-reaching impact, as most of
the standards referenced in the Code of Federal Regulations
are outdated and no longer represent SDO consensus yet still
54
require payment of a fee. Many outdated SDO standards remain legally binding despite being unable to be found or, in
55
some cases, subsequently shown to be hazardous. This lag occurs because the Office of the Federal Register does not permit
a regulation to automatically update whenever its respective
56
standard is revised. So a regulation cannot simply state the
criteria of compliance as “whatever the most recent version” of
a standard is. Regulations may only incorporate existing
standards—not hypothetical standards with uncertain con57
tents—and may only be updated with new rulemaking.
In conclusion, incorporation by reference places SDOs in a
very favorable position. Agencies must use voluntary consensus
49. OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8555, § 6( j) (1998).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2012).
51. This is not a takings issue; this is a fully aware business decision. See
generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
52. See Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10778.
53. Strauss, supra note 16, at 507.
54. Id. at 506–07.
55. E.g., 46 C.F.R. § 160.041-4(b) (2014) (requiring, pursuant to a 1941
Coast Guard regulation, that first aid kits contain phenacetin, now internationally recognized as a carcinogen). SDOs have no obligation to keep standards available after incorporation, and there is discussion of whether an unavailable standard renders its regulation unenforceable. See Mendelson, Taking
Public Access, supra note 8, at 10779.
56. See 1 C.F.R. § 51.1(f ) (2016) (“Incorporation by reference of a publication is limited to the edition of the [standard] that is approved. Future
amendments or revisions of the [standard] are not included.”).
57. Strauss, supra note 16, at 506.
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standards and cannot violate their copyright when doing so.
This enables the organizations to receive an exclusive selfpriced revenue stream that exists for the lifetime of the regula58
tion even where the standard is outdated or abandoned. There
is seemingly no obligation requiring the SDO to sustain availability of the standard or maintain any involvement once the
standard is incorporated. These benefits showcase why organizations never decline to have their standards incorporated into
law, and often refuse to make their standards free to the pub59
lic.
B. HOW COPYRIGHT APPLIES TO VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS
STANDARDS
Voluntary consensus standards are copyright protected
works. The owner of a copyrighted work receives exclusive control over the reproduction, derivation, and distribution of that
work. This grant provides SDOs with the power to control their
standards—a power that agencies cannot infringe upon. An incorporated standard creates a unique situation because the organizations do not author a law—they author a copyrighted
standard—and the designation of legal force comes after the
copyright grant. Since copyright is created by statute, the statute must dictate the terms upon which a copyright ceases.
Some judicial copyright doctrines and sections of the Copyright
Code provide an intuitive starting point for resolving copyright
control of an incorporated standard, but, as this Note will argue
later, none are sufficient. For now, a discussion of copyright
fundamentals is necessary in order to understand the nuances
that will be introduced later. Subsection 1 will outline the relevant statutory basics of copyright and how they apply to voluntary consensus standards. Subsection 2 will discuss the rights
of copyright owners and some limits to those rights.
1. The Purpose, Basics, and Scope of Copyright
The primary purpose of copyright is to incentivize future
authors by granting them temporary exclusive rights over their
works. In exchange, when the copyright expires, the work becomes public domain so the public and society may benefit from

58. See supra notes 44, 53, and accompanying text.
59. See Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 127–28 (testimony of Carl Malamud, President, Public.Resource.Org) (“I have never seen a standards body
object to one of their documents becoming incorporated by law.”).
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60

its use. This purpose is expressed in the Constitution, which
61
gives Congress authority to create copyright law. That authority is currently codified as the Copyright Act of 1976, which has
62
been amended several times. The Copyright Code specifically
dictates where copyright applies and where it does not.
An author may receive copyright protection in “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression
. . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
63
communicated.” An author is anyone to whom a work owes its
64
origin. A work is fixed when “its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
65
duration.” Moreover, an original work is one “independently
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works)
66
. . . possess[ing] at least some minimal degree of creativity.”
These requirements implicate a wide variety of subjects and
forms of creativity, such as literature, photographs, and archi67
tectural plans.
There are limits, however, on which aspects of a work receive copyright protection. For example, facts are excluded from
copyright protection because they are not original to an au68
thor. Utilitarian aspects of copyrighted visual works are also
excluded, such as the wiring or bulb socket of a sculpture used
69
as a table lamp.

60. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“[P]romote the progress of . . . useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their respective
writings . . . .”); see also Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 127 (“Congress did not
sanction an existing right, but created a new one.”).
62. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as Title 17 of the United
States Code); see, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No.
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending duration of copyrights); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (establishing criminal penalties for infringement).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
64. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing a definition of “fixed”).
66. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8) (listing specific types of protected works).
68. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing a definition of “[p]ictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works” and “useful article”); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
218 (1954) (noting copyright protection does not extend to “mechanical or utilitarian aspects”).
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The most difficult determination for copyright, however, is
the idea/expression dichotomy. Copyright law grants authors
protection for their original expressions, but permits other authors to “build freely upon the ideas . . . conveyed by [the]
70
work.” Thus, any ideas present in a copyrighted work are not
71
protected. But even the circuit courts agree that differentiat72
ing between an idea and an expression is a difficult task. If
the level of abstraction for an idea is set very narrowly, subsequent authors may lawfully copy large amounts of an original
work to the detriment of the author. But if the level is set too
high, the original author could claim copyright over broad generalizations like “romance novel” to the detriment of future au73
Thus, for any inquiry, the
thors and the public.
idea/expression line needs to be drawn in a position that provides benefits to an author but still permits other authors to
74
build upon the ideas of that work.
Further complicating this abstraction are scenarios where
an expression cannot be separated from its idea at all. When
one cannot separate an expression from its idea, the expression
then cannot be copyrighted. This concept is known as the mer75
ger doctrine. The merger doctrine was developed by the
76
courts as a means of protecting ideas with limited numbers of
70. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 349–50 (emphasis added).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879)
(stating an author cannot have copyright over methods of operation); 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(b) (2016).
72. See, e.g., Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he line between an expression and an idea can be difficult to determine
. . . .”); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir.
1993) (“Determining which elements . . . are protectable is a difficult task.”);
Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“Drawing the line between idea and expression is a tricky business.”); Robert
R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Other
courts have also struggled to balance these competing concerns . . . .”); Apple
Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983)
(“[Courts] draw[ing] the line between an idea and expression have found difficulty in articulating where it falls.”).
73. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930) (describing how removing copyrighted portions of a story piece by piece
eventually leaves “no more than the most general statement of what the play
is about, and at times might consist only of its title”).
74. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971).
75. Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes
à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 788
(2006).
76. Russell Hasan, Copyright’s Merger Doctrine as a Solution to Conflicts
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expressions from being monopolized by the authors who would
77
copyright those limited expressions first. For example, in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, the Ninth Circuit
held that the idea and expressions of a “jeweled bee pin” are
equivalent, noting that any similarities between different jeweled bee pins are simply a result of them being jeweled bee
78
pins. When a court determines that few expressions are available to an idea, the merger doctrine applies and the court need
79
not wait for all possible expressions to be copyrighted. Thus,
an expression can maintain copyright, but not if it is one of limited ways to express an idea.
Voluntary consensus standards meet the statutory requirements for copyright protection. There is no question of the
80
independent creativity involved in authoring a standard. Further, any voluntary consensus standard is just one of seemingly
infinite ways in which to express the idea of a safety code so
81
there is no merger issue involved. On its own, a voluntary
consensus standard is indeed a copyright protected work.
2. Rights of Copyright Owners
The owner of a copyright is given exclusive power to control
the reproduction, derivation, and distribution of that copyright82
ed work. For SDOs developing voluntary consensus standards,
these rights last for either 120 years after creation of the
standard or 95 years after the standard’s first publication,
83
whichever comes first. Anyone who violates one of these rights

Between Copyright Law and Freedom of Speech, CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.,
http://www.cardozoaelj.com/hasan_blog (last visited Nov. 24, 2016).
77. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir.
1967).
78. See Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742 (“There is no greater similarity between the pins of plaintiff and defendants than is inevitable from the use of
jewel-encrusted bee forms in both.”).
79. See Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 679 (“[Merger doctrine’s] operation need
not await an attempt to copyright all possible forms.”).
80. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (“As the organizational author of original works, SBCCI indisputably holds a copyright in its model building codes.”).
81. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (E.D.
Tex. 1999) (“[T]he subject of building codes is open to a number of different
types of expressions.”).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(3) (2012).
83. Id. § 302(c) (explaining the duration of copyright on works made for
hire).
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84

is guilty of copyright infringement. A derivative work is one
that is based upon another, such as a translation or dramatiza85
tion. Since incorporation by reference deals with a single established version of a standard, derivative rights do not arise
when SDO rights are violated. Reproduction and distribution
are the most relevant rights in this context.
The reproduction right is the bedrock of the copyright own86
er’s power. Generally, the reproduction right prohibits anyone
from copying the protected aspects of a work into another fixed
87
copy. There are different degrees of copying. The most
straightforward type is the exact copy, whereby a substantial
88
portion of protected elements are simply duplicated. This of89
90
ten occurs in cases dealing with photography, literature, or
91
music. A total duplication of a work consisting of non92
protected elements still represents unlawful reproduction. On
the opposite end is the de minimis copy—one “so trivial that
93
the law will not impose legal consequences.”
84. See id. § 501(a). But see Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents, 633 F.3d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that the states still
possess sovereign immunity in the realm of copyright infringement violations).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “derivative work”).
86. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 248 (4th ed. 2015).
87. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548
(1985) (“[C]opyright does not prevent . . . copying . . . those constituent elements that are not original . . . as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the author’s original contributions.”).
88. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
464 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[A] copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial part, and by duplicating it exactly . . . .” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976))).
89. See, e.g., Images Audio Visual Prods., Inc. v. Perini Bldg Co., 91 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, 1079–80 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (duplicating copyrighted commercial construction photographs infringed the photograph owner’s right of reproduction).
90. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp.
1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding a printing company infringed the copyright of academic articles when it wholesale-copied substantial excerpts from
the articles into topical classroom packets).
91. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013–14
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that computer users that download and upload copyrighted songs infringe the owner’s reproduction rights to both the musical
composition and the sound recording).
92. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d
Cir. 1980) (“A verbatim reproduction of another work . . . even in the realm of
nonfiction, is actionable as copyright infringement.”).
93. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.
1997).
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Copyright would serve little purpose if it were limited to
complete duplication. Thus reproduction rights also prevent
94
copies that make use of only some protected elements. These
are called substantially similar copies and they infringe upon
95
protected elements but do so with less obvious copying. The
various types of copying illustrate how a reproduction right can
extend broadly to prohibit many similar copies. In the context
of voluntary consensus standards, reproduction of an incorporated standard makes for an easy infringement action. Because
citizens need to know the exact terms of a legal obligation, infringement usually involves duplicating the entire standard
and not just portions of it.
In addition to reproduction, SDOs have the exclusive right
of distribution. The distribution right protects against disseminating unauthorized copies of the protected work “to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
96
lending.” Although reproduction and distribution often implicate each other when infringement is involved, distribution is a
97
distinct action. This provides copyright owners with more options for control. The threat of distribution infringement has a
suffocating effect on the availability of incorporated standards
that are outside of the SDO’s direct sales. It prevents commercial legal publishers, for example, from ever taking the initiative to compile incorporated standards and sell them as a vol98
ume, despite the obvious market for such a product.
As noted above, these rights are not absolute and are subject to a variety of exceptions. The most famous exception is fair
99
use. Fair use is a statutory affirmative defense to copyright
infringement, permitting a user to infringe the rights of a copy94. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 257–58 (discussing the concept of
the substantially similar copy).
95. See, e.g., Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072,
1076–81 (9th Cir. 2006) (analyzing similarity between, inter alia, plots, character developments, themes, and dialogue of two different television show
scripts).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
97. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 346 (noting the “hand in hand”
nature of reproduction and distribution).
98. Perhaps the easiest example to provide here is Thomson Reuters. Arguably the market leader in selling consolidated legal resources, the company
does not sell any product that consolidates all incorporated regulations. Instead, to distribute voluntary consensus standards they operate a website that
merely serves as a retail outlet for proprietary SDO publications. See TECH
STREET, http://www.techstreet.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2016).
99. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 563.
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right holder “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re100
porting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.” Fair use represents a principle that an informed society requires using cop101
yrighted materials to communicate. The Copyright Code sets
out four non-exhaustive factors that a court must weigh when
determining if a fair use has occurred. The first factor is “the
102
This factor considers
purpose and character of the use.”
whether the use “transforms” or adds something new to the
copyrighted work, such as reproducing books into a digital form
103
to enable computer searches for single words. The second fac104
tor is “the nature of the copyrighted work.” This evaluates the
characteristics of the original work. For example, copying a fac105
tual work is more allowable than a fictional work. The third
factor is “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
106
relation to the [original] copyrighted work as a whole.” This
107
includes both quantity and quality of the used portions. Lastly, courts must consider “the effect of the use upon the potential
108
market for or value of the copyrighted work.” The potential
market includes both the effects of that specific use, and the
109
adverse effects which would occur if use were widespread.
Despite this guidance, fair use practicality suffers. First, it
is so factually circumstantial that it offers very little predicta110
bility for anyone using a copyrighted expression. This is prob100. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
101. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 564–65 (noting that some of the
most important topics of discourse require balancing usage of a copyrighted
work with the copyright owner’s interests).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
103. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214–19 (2d Cir.
2015) (discussing analysis that shows digital reproductions of books for the
purpose of searching words and phrases contained within is a new purpose
and character).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
105. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563
(1985) (“The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual
works than works of fiction or fantasy.”).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
107. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710–11 (2d Cir. 2013) (analyzing
whether an artist’s dark, gothic alterations to a photographer’s scientific documentary photographs retained too much of the original photograph as to be
substantial).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
109. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590–94 (1994)
(discussing the potential market effects that a parody song has on the original
on which it is based).
110. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090
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lematic because communication sometimes requires using copyrighted expressions. Fair use forces a user to balance the need
to use the expression with the risk of committing infringe111
ment. This reveals the second concern: fair use is only applied
as a defense to infringement. Unlike usage of facts and ideas,
which by themselves cannot be infringed, a use must be litigated before knowing whether the exception applies. As discussed
in Part II, fair use may not always apply to reproduction and
distribution of incorporated standards.
C. HOW COPYRIGHT APPLIES TO LAWS
It is a well-established rule that laws cannot be copyrighted. This rule is reflected in a variety of ways at the federal level. For example, the Copyright Code expressly denies protection
112
for any work of the United States Government. Similarly, the
U.S. Copyright Office will not register a copyright in any legislation, judicial opinion, agency regulation, or work that has the
113
force of law. But this rule is insufficient by itself for solving
the problem posed above. Incorporated standards are not works
of the United States and the Copyright Office does not promul114
gate binding rules. The Copyright Code itself is actually entirely silent on how copyright applies to laws. Instead, the rule
arose from a pair of Supreme Court cases over one hundred
years ago.
The rule originates from 1834 in Wheaton v. Peters, which
115
held that judicial opinions cannot be copyrighted. In that

(2007); see also Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that amount and substantiality analysis must
be conducted not just by itself but within the context of purpose and use as
well).
111. See id. at 1096 (noting the potential for “high costs of litigation and
the potentially enormous statutory damages” if a court disagrees with a user’s
fair use judgement).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 105.
113. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES § 313.6(C)(1)–(2) (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
114. See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir.
2016) (“[A]n opinion expressed by the Copyright Office . . . does not receive
Chevron deference of the sort accorded to rulemaking by authorized agencies
. . . .”).
115. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834) (“[T]he court [sic] are
unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the
written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot
confer on any reporter any such right.”).
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case, an early Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions sued his
successor for copyright infringement when the successor republished court opinions originally issued and published during the
117
plaintiff’s tenure. The Supreme Court did not give any reasoning for that holding, however. The Court later provided reasoning for the rule that judicial opinions could not be copyrighted in Banks v. Manchester. In Banks, an Ohio Supreme
Court reporter alleged copyright infringement against a thirdparty publisher for copying two opinions from the reporter’s of118
ficial publications. The Banks Court reaffirmed Wheaton, and
finally clarified the holding by stating that “[t]he whole work
done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for
119
publication to all . . . .” The Court further explained that
judges, in their official capacities, are outside of copyright’s
purpose, since judges earn “a stated annual salary, fixed by
law, and can themselves have no pecuniary interest or proprietorship, as against the public at large, in the fruits of their ju120
dicial labors.”
Since then courts have applied a broader rule from the reasoning that laws in any form—statute, regulation, or judicial
121
opinion—are not eligible for copyright. And up until now,
there has been little controversy about the copyright ineligibility of laws. The case law since Banks firmly establishes the existing broader rule that laws in all forms are not subject to copyright for two reasons. The first is policy (needing to know laws
one is bound to), and the second is incentive (the laws are written by individuals whose public duty is to write them sans incentive). As discussed below in Part II, however, the fusion of
116. The Reporter of Decisions is the editor tasked with preparing Supreme Court opinions for publication in the United States Reports. See SUP.
CT. R. 41.
117. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 593–95.
118. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 247–50 (1888).
119. Id. at 253–54 (emphasis added) (citing Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559,
560 (Mass. 1886)).
120. Id. at 253; see also, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n,
121 F.3d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he public owns the opinions because it
pays the judges’ salaries.”).
121. See, e.g., Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs. V. Code Tech, Inc., 628 F.2d
730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[J]udicial opinions and statutes are in the public domain and are not subject to copyright.”); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th
Cir. 1898) (“[N]o one can obtain the exclusive right to publish the laws of a
state . . . .”); Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(“[N]either judicial opinions nor statutes can be copyrighted.”).
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traditional law-making with private standard authorship to
create legal obligations does not fit neatly into this analysis.
The functioning of incorporation by reference, combined with
the silence of copyright statutes on the eligibility of laws, creates legitimate concerns that remain unanswered about whether incorporated copyrighted works should continue to be protected by copyright.
Although laws cannot be copyrighted, incorporated standards are copyrightable because they are original works of authorship. Authors of voluntary consensus standards can claim
exclusive rights in the standard under § 106 of the Copyright
122
Code. Then, when an agency incorporates the standard into
123
law, it must respect the copyright of the SDO. This prevents
the agency from infringing the SDO’s reproduction or distribution rights in any way, and permits the SDO to capitalize on its
124
placement in law. The Copyright Office will not acknowledge
125
a copyright in works that have legal force, but by this point
the SDO will have already obtained its copyright. There is no
statutory provision revoking or limiting a work’s copyright it
after it is enacted into law.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE A SOLUTION
FOR ENABLING ACCESS TO VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS
STANDARDS INCORPORATED INTO LAW
Copyright does not provide a solution that makes incorporated standards unconditionally accessible to the public. There
are two reasons for this: (1) the copyright code does not address
how copyright applies to laws; (2) incorporated standards are
actual copyrighted works, confusing the analysis that would
122. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (“As the organizational author of original works, SBCCI indisputably holds a copyright in its model building codes.”). But see Int’l Code
Council, Inc., v. Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, Inc., No. 02 C 5610, 2006 WL 850879, at
*23 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“[G]enuine material disputes of fact exist as to whether
Plaintiff owns, by operation of the work-for-hire doctrine with respect to the
acts of authorship by the technical subcommittee members or ICC staff liaisons, many of the allegedly infringed provisions in the IBC 2000.”).
123. OMB Circular No. A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8555, § 6( j ) (Feb. 19,
1998).
124. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 743 (noting that
SDOs retain an entitlement to charge for access to their copyrighted materials); Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10778 & n.26 (noting
that executive order draft revisions are silent on SDO access fees).
125. COMPENDIUM, supra note 113 (describing, as examples of works with
legal force, statutes, regulations, judicial opinions, and edicts of government).
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otherwise apply to traditional laws. This Part will examine
whether copyright’s other doctrines can adequately protect access to incorporated standards despite the statute failing to
specifically address copyright of laws in general. This Note concludes that they cannot. Section A explains how the Supreme
Court’s Banks analysis does not cleanly apply to incorporated
standards. Section B examines whether a law can be a fact or
idea for copyright purposes and how that may apply to incorporated standards. Finally, Section C shows how fair use fails to
provide a last-resort solution for protecting use of incorporated
standards.
A. THE RULE IN BANKS DOES NOT APPLY TO INCORPORATED
STANDARDS
The broader Banks rule teaches that traditional laws are
not eligible for copyright because they need to be accessed
freely by the public and their author’s public duties are not
within the incentivizing purpose of copyright. First, incorporated standards are distinguished from traditional laws by the
incentivized purpose of their authors. The Banks rule only analyzes laws that are written by lawmakers in their official capacities and ignores circumstances like incorporation by reference
where laws are initially authored by private parties. The decision in Banks turned on the incentive of the author: the Court
found judicial opinions could not be copyrighted because the
public duty of judges to draft opinions is outside the purpose of
copyright law—to cultivate future works for the benefit of soci126
ety by providing authors with an incentive to create them.
Thus, lawmakers draft laws because it is their public duty and
the Supreme Court does not recognize that duty as being with127
in the scope of copyright’s incentivizing purpose.
While traditional laws therefore cannot be copyrighted, incorporated standards can still maintain copyright because SDO
128
authorship is within copyright’s incentivizing purpose. As
126. See generally Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) (noting the
word “incentive” does not appear in the opinion).
127. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 796 (noting the SBCCI argument regarding
judge economic incentives); Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs. v. Code Tech., Inc.,
628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980) (“BOCA’s argument implies that the rule of
Wheaton v. Peters was based on the public’s property interest in work produced by legislators and judges, who are, of course, government employees.”).
128. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 796 (noting the SBCCI argument that private
authors have different interests than government employees); Bldg. Officials
& Code Adm’rs., 628 F.2d at 734 (“BOCA argues that [their code], unlike judi-
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mentioned previously, it is only after the SDOs receive copyright that the standards become incorporated into law. Because
the Banks reasoning relies on the authorship incentive purpose, incorporated standards will be able to maintain copyright
under the current Copyright Code, placing them outside of
Banks even after the standards become incorporated.
This after-the-fact legal effect indicates the second reason
Banks cannot apply: SDOs do not claim copyright over the actual law, but something the law refers to. Banks involved an attempt to copyright a judicially drafted legal opinion, which is
significantly different from a voluntary consensus standard.
The SDOs do not draft legally binding materials—they draft
copyrighted works that later become referenced by a law that
lawmakers author. Thus, the SDO is not claiming copyright
over the actual law that references its standard. It is claiming
copyright over the standard that exists regardless of any lawmaker’s decision to incorporate it into law. If the SDO attempted to claim copyright over the law itself, surely it would be denied. Additionally, such a claim would be redundant because
the text of the standard is not included in the law. So the SDO
would be claiming copyright over a law that simply contains a
single sentence reference to the author’s own code. In other
words, there is no need for a copyright claim over the law itself
referencing the standard because the SDO already has a copyright over the part that matters. This would not change even if
the concept of “law ownership” was broad and more abstract,
such as society owning the laws instead of the lawmaker that
129
literally drafted it.
Therefore, under Banks, SDOs have a valid copyright in
their incorporated standards because the standards were privately authored within the incentivizing scope of copyright despite their subsequent legal effect. Additionally, the claim is
not over an enacted law, but a work the law refers to. Strictly
applying the Banks principle, SDOs are within their rights to
protect their copyright interest. Practically, however, this outcome is what the Banks Court was trying to prevent—citizens

cial opinions and statutes, is principally the work . . . of itself-a private organization operating with little or no government support . . . .”).
129. See, e.g., Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs., 628 F.2d at 734 (“[C]itizens
are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually
drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of
the public . . . .”).
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will not have free access to their legal obligations. This exposes the inadequacy of the current common law approach and
suggests a need for a new solution.
B. LAWS AS FACTS AND IDEAS
Facts are not eligible for copyright and limited expressions
of an idea will be precluded from protection. While it seems intuitive that a law is an idea with a limited expression, this
premise fails when the expression of a law may be arbitrarily
designated as anything. Similarly, an existing law has a factual
element to it. But copyright’s non-protective treatment of facts
hinges on their lack of originality. Voluntary consensus standards are undeniably original works, which contradicts any fact
analysis. Even though the mechanics of ideas, expressions, and
facts can easily be applied to a voluntary consensus standard
and the separate law that references it, the same familiar issues surface from Part II.A: an incorporated standard is not a
traditional law and the arbitrary way that it receives legal
force does not transform it so either. Subsection 1 examines
whether laws can be analyzed as facts. Subsection 2 evaluates
whether a law is an idea and how the expression of an incorporated standard should be analyzed against the law referencing
it.
1. Laws as Facts
For copyright purposes, the Supreme Court has never expressly held that laws are facts. The Court has explained that
the essence of a fact is that it is not original to any author, but
131
rather is something to be discovered. Under this reasoning a
law could be considered a fact. The Copyright Code is, for example, a factual thing that exists to be discovered by someone.
But this reasoning begins to break down in the context of anything that actually originated in an incentivized author because
whether something is discovered is a matter of perspective. For
example, Prince wrote, produced, and performed the entirety of
132
his album 1999 all by himself. To anyone who is not Prince,

130. See Banks, 128 U.S. at 253 (“[T]he law, which, binding every citizen, is
free for publication to all . . . .”).
131. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991).
132. See Joey DeGroot, Seven Great Albums Recorded by One Person:
Prince, Paul McCartney, and More, MUSIC TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www
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1999 would be a factual thing to be discovered (perhaps in a
record store). To Prince, 1999 was not discovered, because it
originated from his efforts. Analyzing 1999 as a fact would then
allow anyone who is not Prince to make use of 1999 without restriction—clearly violating Prince’s exclusive rights to 1999.
Thus, analyzing any original work as a fact leads to a contradictory result. The act of Prince creating 1999 was a factual
event that occurred, which may be reproduced, distributed, or
translated into a derivative. The album itself is not. This applies to an incorporated standard as well. Anyone who is not
the SDO author would be discovering the standard.
The laws-as-facts analysis has seen some success in courts,
but the outcomes still provide little guidance for incorporated
standards. For example, in Veeck v. Southern Building Code
Congress International, the majority held laws must be factual
because they cannot be stated in any other language than that
133
which is expressed in the law. One could argue under this
reasoning that incorporated standards are facts because they
can only be stated the way the SDOs have written them. The
court’s reasoning is questionable, however, because it mistakes
the essence of a fact. Facts are not determined by whether they
can be stated differently—John F. Kennedy was assassinated;
A man murdered President John F. Kennedy—they are determined by lack of origin in an author. John F. Kennedy’s assassination is a fact that originated in no one, no matter how many
different ways it can be stated.
After accepting that laws are facts, the Veeck majority does
not explain what legally causes a copyrighted standard to become a single unprotectable fact. In that case, the SDO did not
author the laws of a city, it authored several safety standards
134
that became incorporated. The majority avoids explaining
this standard-into-fact transformation by instead bizarrely
holding that the copyright held on the standard is not entirely
unprotected: if a would-be infringer reproduces or distributes
the standard as the law, the laws-as-facts analysis applies and
the SDO cannot enforce infringement claims because it cannot

.musictimes.com/articles/5280/20140406/seven-great-albums-recorded-by-one
-person-prince-paul-mccartney-and-more.htm.
133. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 801 (quoting Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l,
Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 416 (5th Cir. 2001) (Little, J., dissenting)).
134. See id. at 793–94 (noting that SBCCI’s Standard Gas Code, Standard
Fire Prevention Code, and Standard Mechanical Code were at issue in the
case).
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control a fact; but if someone uses the standard as a model code
135
the SDO may exert control over the use. But what is the difference between these two uses? There could be no way to know
if the source that was copied from was the copyrighted work or
136
the law when both are identical. There is no use or value to a
copyright if an exact replica of the protected work exists simultaneously as an unprotected fact that may be wholesale reproduced and distributed by anyone.
And even if this bi-usage rationale was accepted and it precluded a copyright infringement claim for reproducing or publishing a standard as law, it does not solve the problem of SDOs
controlling access to the public’s legal obligations by charging
access fees when law seekers are forced to obtain it from them.
2. Laws as Ideas
Now an analysis of whether a law is an idea with a limited
number of expressions. Recall that the merger doctrine requires a difficult analysis of competing interests before an idea
and expression are merged. To begin with, there are multiple
ways to express model codes and simply enacting one into law
does not render it any less than one of many ways to express a
137
building code. However, using a law as the idea that an expression is analyzed against (instead of the original idea it was
authored under, i.e., a safety code) requires distorting merger
doctrine analysis that cannot be accepted.
Under normal merger doctrine analysis, the copyright eligibility of a standard would be determined by analyzing the
standard as a single expression of a model code (the idea).
Then, the court would weigh whether SDO interests (economic
incentive) outweigh the public’s interest (only way to express
the idea of a model code) before deciding whether the expres-

135. See id. at 800 (“[W]e hold that when Veeck copied only ‘the law’ of Anna and Savoy, Texas, which he obtained from SBCCI’s publication, and when
he reprinted only ‘the law’ of those municipalities, he did not infringe . . . .”).
136. This dilemma brings to mind Judge Learned Hand’s famous independent creation hypothetical: “[I]f by some magic a man who had never
known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an
‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though
they might of course copy Keats’s.” Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). The same trouble surfaces: duplicate copies exist
as both protected and in the public domain only by magic.
137. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 807 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“A complex
code, even a simple one, can be expressed in a variety of ways.”); Veeck v. S.
Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
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sion should be merged and therefore unprotected. Since the
standard is one of infinite ways to express a model code, there
is no public interest to merge the expression with the idea and
the standard would retain its copyright.
But this is not the question under laws as ideas analysis.
Instead, the law-as-idea context is asking whether a specific
wording or expression is the only way to express a particular
law. For example, is the text of the Eighth Amendment the only
way to express the Eighth Amendment? The answer would
have to be yes. But the amendment’s text could be a replica of
anything the lawmakers want it to be—Anna Karenina, The
Raven, or a George Carlin joke—linking those expressions to an
idea it would never be analyzed against under standard merger
analysis, which poses a problem for practice. Consider a real
world possibility: a person drafts a philosophical text on ethics
and morals. In the broadest abstract, this author’s work would
be one possible way to express the idea of “how to behave.” The
day after its publication, Congress enacts it as Title 57 of the
United States Code, nullifying its copyright because it is the
only way to express the idea of Title 57. But the author didn’t
create an expression of Title 57. The expression itself is being
138
declared an idea, simply by choosing it to be so. This completely goes against merger doctrine analysis, which requires
an expression to be analyzed in light of the idea it was authored under. The whole purpose of merger vanishes when a
copyrighted expression is compared to arbitrary ideas that have
no relation to its essence.
The merger doctrine does not change a copyrighted expression into the sole unprotected expression of an entirely unrelated idea by simply incorporating it into law and declaring it to
be “merged” with an arbitrarily chosen idea. Likewise, there
are practical problems with declaring original works to be facts.
These fundamentals of copyright analysis do not change just
because a standard is incorporated and given legal effect.
C. FAIR USE AS A LAST DEFENSE
Since the previous Sections have shown that voluntary
consensus standards retain their copyrights when incorporated,
it is important to determine if a fair use defense can safely provide the public with access to incorporated standards. This Sec138. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 807 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“[T]he reasoning is wholly tautological.”).
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tion will address whether fair use is an appropriate solution to
139
preserve the public’s use of incorporated standards. Though
fair use looks like a reasonable option because it protects many
uses in which the text of an incorporated standard would be reproduced, it ultimately fails because it cannot protect a usage
that seeks to simply spread information.
To begin, fair use is not an ideal solution procedurally because, even if it applies, it would require costly litigation, which
would undermine goals of improving access. Fair use is a defense to established infringement, meaning any user would
have to establish in court that the exception applies. And because SDOs would initiate the litigation, they have complete
control to determine strategically when to bring infringement
140
actions. This is not merely a hypothetical: selective copyright
enforcement is a known strategy among owners of copyright to
141
manipulate the value of their works. The cost and timeconsuming nature of lawsuits, combined with SDO’s discretion
of when to bring suits, illustrates how even an effective fair use
claim does not provide optimum access for the public. Reproducing or distributing a legal obligation ought to not require defending a copyright infringement suit, especially given the unpredictable nature of asserting the defense.
Substantively, a user of an incorporated standard has an
uncomfortably probable chance of failing a fair use analysis
given the nature of how laws are communicated. It would be
difficult to use incorporated standards in a different way. Legal
writing and analysis often must reproduce the text of laws and
142
opinions verbatim in order to be effective. It would not be useful for purposes of teaching, information, or analysis if the exact text could not be used. Similarly, judicial statutory interpretation standards first seek to derive plain meaning from the
139. But see Veeck, 293 F.3d at 806–07 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); id.
at 817 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“[F]air use . . . [is] more than adequate to preserve the ability of residents . . . to copy any portions of the code that they
want or need to view.”).
140. See id. at 800 (“Free availability of the law, by this logic, has degenerated into availability as long as [SDOs] choose[ ] not to file suit.”).
141. See, e.g., Sean Kirkpatrick, Comment, Like Holding a Bird: What the
Prevalence of Fansubbing Can Teach Us About the Use of Strategic Selective
Copyright Enforcement, 21 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 131, 133–34 (2003)
(analyzing the market strategy of Japanese corporations to withhold aggressive copyright infringement litigation schemes against fan bases).
142. See Collyn A. Peddie, The Ten Commandments of Legal Writing,
HOUS. LAW., July/Aug. 1994, at 36, 40–41 (noting legal communication requires clearly knowing and understanding the law).
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143

literal text of a law. This would be a futile task without the
exact text. It is therefore crucial to use the exact words of a law
when communicating it. Unfortunately, replication is often not
treated positively by the third factor of fair use analysis, the
amount and substantiality, unless the use is different and
transformative.
Replication is only part of the analysis, however. Simply
being within one of the expressed purposes of the fair use stat144
ute does not automatically protect the usage. But if the purpose does fall within one of those purposes, like criticism, teaching, or research, duplicating text may be more forgivable even if
145
the entire work is reproduced. The nature of the copyrighted
work factor would further support a fair use finding since incorporated standards are informational and copying of informa146
tional works is more likely to be found in favor of fair use.
Lastly, the market effect factor for these uses would support fair
use for two reasons: (1) incorporated standards and works critiquing them serve different markets and it is unlikely that an
SDO would simultaneously offer works that criticize its own
product; and (2) the negative market effects of effective criti147
cism are not a recognized harm under copyright law. Thus,
copying substantial portions of an incorporated standard for
critical or annotated educational purposes would have a very
strong presumption of fair use, thereby protecting public access. But this list of purposes is not exhaustive, and there is
one remaining purpose that poses a significant problem—the
informational purpose.
Anyone desiring to read a law is likely to seek a source that
contains the law in its entirety, because of the importance of
exact wording. Recalling the different markets described above,
a person seeking to read a work would not seek out a criticism

143. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (noting that the first
step of statutory construction is to “determine whether the statutory text is
plain and unambiguous”).
144. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994)
(describing the fair use categories as illustrative to analysis).
145. E.g., Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689, 714 (W.D. Va. 2014) (acknowledging that courts widely accept reproducing a protected work in its entirety for criticism and opinion).
146. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d
152, 157–58 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding books on L. Ron Hubbard’s life, religion,
and family were factual in nature and permitted greater leniency for copying).
147. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92 (discussing the market effects of
parody music on a song and its derivatives).
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of that work as a substitute. In the law publishing context,
then, there is absolutely a need for sources that that simply
148
display the unaltered law free of criticism or annotations. But
this “informational” purpose for reproducing incorporated
standards is far less likely to be considered fair use in comparison to the statutory transformational purposes.
Recall that the first factor, purpose, evaluates whether the
use supersedes the original work or adds something new, and
149
whether the use is commercial or non-profit educational. This
is problematic from the start because an informational purpose
does not fit cleanly into any of the statute’s transformation categories, nor is it commercial or non-profit educational—it is
just to spread information. A non-transformative purpose does
not bar a finding of fair use, but it severely hamstrings the likelihood of fair use by damaging the context that the other factors
150
are considered in. Such as the amount and substantiality factor: while wholesale copying would probably be acceptable under a criticism purpose, under a non-transformative purpose,
151
wholesale copying goes directly against fair use. Under the
market effect factor, a non-transformative use either directly
usurps the market of the original work by competing against its
replica, or destroys the market entirely where the reproductions are given away for free (as is likely with spreading infor152
mation). All of these factors taken together provide a gloomy
projection for an informational purpose.
Failure to protect an informational purpose is the deal
breaker. While fair use may be adequate where usage is for

148. See, e.g., THOMSON REUTERS ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 9 (2016) (noting that, in 2015 alone, the Thomson West Legal Services Division earned $3.4
billion in revenue).
149. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79 (noting the evaluation of purpose
and use); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012) (requiring evaluation of the “purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes”).
150. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d
1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“In the context of non-transformative uses, at least, and except insofar as they touch on the [market] fourth factor, the
other statutory factors seem considerably less important.”).
151. E.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 311 (4th Cir.
2010) (“Unless the use is transformative, the use of a copyrighted work in its
entirety will normally weigh against a finding of fair use.”).
152. E.g., Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236,
1242 (D. Colo. 2006) (reselling unauthorized “clean” films was a nontransformative use that usurped a market copyright owners were entitled to
engage).
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criticism and the like, if the fair use defense cannot protect
something like a non-profit informational website for simply
displaying the text of an incorporated standard, then it cannot
be sufficient to protect the public’s access. A partial access to
law, in hopes of gambling a satisfactory fair use defense to copyright infringement, does not correspond with the public’s need
to access the laws that govern it. Finally, even while fair use
may provide an opportunity for reproducing the text of an incorporated standard in many uses, it does not resolve the issue
of paying to obtain the standard.
III. HOW COPYRIGHT CAN BE CHANGED TO PROTECT
ACCESS TO INCORPORATED VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS
STANDARDS
Revising the Copyright Code will be necessary to allow incorporated standards to be obtained without cost, and be free
for reproduction and distribution. These changes will inevitably
affect how standard industries operate, but they will not impair
their ability to maintain competitiveness and accrue substantial revenue. This Part discusses how copyright law should be
changed. First, Section A proposes finally adding laws to the
§ 102 subject matter statute. Then Section B introduces considerations for copyrighted works that voluntarily receive subsequent legal effect. Finally, Section C raises and defends the
economic and incentive implications for altering the copyright
of incorporated standards.
A. ADDING LAWS TO § 102
Despite the extensive history of denying copyright in laws,
the Copyright Code does not address the copyright eligibility of
laws leaving enforcement of this longstanding rule vulnerable
and unclear. The Copyright Office will reject registrations of
materials with legal effect, but they are not policy makers nor
153
do they write or bindingly interpret the statutes. Courts have

153. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 113 (denying copyright in state and federal statutes, judicial opinions, and regulations). In addition, the behavior of
the Copyright Office indicates that it should not be relied upon to side on the
interest of the public when rights holder’s interests are at stake. The Copyright Office has a troubling pattern of blatantly misinterpreting and misapplying copyright statutes to expand the power of copyright holders, injecting its
pro-rights holder’s opinions into policy topics beyond its place or expertise, and
courts repeatedly ignoring or rejecting its opinions as contrary to the statutes.
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repeatedly found that laws should not be copyrightable. But despite the consensus in case law, the subject of copyrighted laws
continues to surface in unorthodox cases, often where new
technology or third party/private organizations are involved
154
with the drafting process. These create factual circumstances
that do not fit cleanly into the case law.
Legislation is required to ensure laws and materials with
legal effect are not subject to copyright for all circumstances.
Congress should therefore add laws to the § 102(b) general sub155
ject matter exclusions. Doing so would be consistent with how
copyright law developed. Much of the prohibited subject matter
in § 102(b) first developed in case law and was later written in156
to the statute by lawmakers. The case precedent of denying
copyright protection to laws is extensive enough to represent a
judicial consensus that laws cannot be copyrighted, thus mak157
ing it ripe for inclusion into § 102(b). In addition, this would
be in line with congressional intent. A Senate report for the
Copyright Act stated the purpose of § 102(b) was to codify al158
ready-established doctrines of ideas and concepts. Codifying
the long-standing consensus on copyright eligibility of laws
would bolster that purpose.
Adding laws to § 102(b) finally establishes that laws and
materials with legal effect are unrestricted and free for the
See generally PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, CAPTURED: SYSTEMIC BIAS AT THE UNITED
STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE 1–2 (2016).
154. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 708
(2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the effect of “star pagination” on digital copies of
court opinions); Complaint, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org,
Inc., No. 1:15-cv-02594-MHC (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015) (alleging that annotations of a state code are copyrightable where state declares annotated version
to be the official state code).
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (2016).
156. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 90–91 (“[L]egislative history
. . . indicates that Congress intended §102(b) in part to codify the holding of
Baker.”).
157. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“The whole work
done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of
the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” (emphasis
added)); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834) (“[N]o reporter . . . can
have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court . . . .”); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1898) (“[N]o one can obtain the exclusive
right to publish the laws of a state . . . .”); Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F.
Supp. 110, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (“[T]his court holds that a state may not copyright its statutes.”).
158. See S. REP. NO. 93-983, at 108 (1974) (“Its purpose is to restate, in the
context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy
between expression and idea remains unchanged.”).
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public’s use. As technology and practices like incorporation by
reference evolve, they will continue to push the boundaries of
what may be copyrighted. Only a statutory solution that resolves the issue outright protects access to laws under novel
circumstances. By adding laws to § 102(b), Congress removes
the possibility that any laws or materials with legal effect can
be subject to exclusive control.
B. FOR COPYRIGHTED WORKS SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN LEGAL
FORCE
Simply adding laws to § 102(b), however, is not enough to
remedy this issue by itself because it does not change the fact
that a valid copyright exists in incorporated standards. The
best approach would be to treat any copyrighted work as free of
control the moment it is given legal effect. Incorporated standards are distinguishable from other privately developed works
that receive legal effect, like the Model Penal Code (MPC), in
that they are meant to be concealed from publication, sometimes spawn copyright infringement litigation, and require the
159
public to spend significantly to obtain. The MPC and state
statutes that adopt portions of it are publicly distributed, thus
there is no gateway allowing the MPC authors to exercise control. Thus, while adding laws to § 102(b) may prevent controls
like infringement lawsuits, SDOs may still continue to control
access to their hidden incorporated standards with fees because
they are the only source for obtaining them. Additional reform
is therefore needed to fully address the problem.
This Note suggests that Congress create a provision specifically altering the copyright of a protected work that has been
given legal force, by assigning that work to the public do160
main. A copyright owner cannot be forced by the government
161
to distribute or share their copyrighted work. Voluntary con159. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012) (“[M]atter reasonably available to the
class of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register
when incorporated by reference . . . .” (emphasis added)).
160. Cf. Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 127 (statement of Rep. Darrell
Issa) (“[I]f I am willing to have [my standard] released to everyone, as an owner of that copyright and an undivided owner, don’t [I] ultimately have no possibility of protection?”).
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2012) (noting involuntary transfer orders by
government are generally prohibited); see also Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v.
Clinton, 766 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he United States copyright of
an individual author shall be secured to that author, and cannot be taken
away by any involuntary transfer.”).
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sensus standards enacted into law are not done under a “tak162
ings clause,” but rather are voluntarily offered by their SDOs.
A copyright holder always has the ability to assign their work
163
to the public domain. There are many financial benefits that
come with incorporated standards besides sales to parties who
are mandated to comply. If some SDOs do not want to give up
the copyright on their standards, they can simply opt not to offer them up for incorporation and forego the other benefits that
come from adoption. There are many competitors that might
take their place, whose standards still encompass quality. And
some incorporated standards are already made available for
free online by their owners. This provision would also enable
the government, legal publishers, and public advocates to prevent misplacement by preserving the standard online, while
164
maintaining the size considerations of the Federal Register.
The provision will also help agencies make standards widely available. Statutory limitations prevent agencies from violat165
ing copyrights. The most recent Office of Federal Register efforts to reform incorporation by reference continue to reject
many reasonable solicited public proposals because of copyright
166
conflicts. With the provision, agencies will not be forced to
162. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 547 (discussing the shortcomings of a
hypothetical “takings” arrangement between SDOs and government agencies);
cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding government
forcing private owner to transfer land to another private owner for development of public use under Fifth Amendment).
163. See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594,
598 (2d Cir. 1951) (“[An] author . . . may abandon . . . his copyright in [a
work]. . . .” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Timothy K. Armstrong,
Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for
the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 391–95 (2010) (discussing
the uncertainty of copyright abandonment in case law and recent amendments).
164. It is likely that the digital age has nullified the space-saving considerations that brought about the practice of incorporation by reference in the first
place. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 523–24 (discussing how the Internet and
electronic distribution have replaced physical space concerns).
165. See Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,270 (Nov. 7,
2014) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 51) (“[W]e balanced our statutory obligations regarding reasonable availability of the standards with: (1) U.S. copyright law . . . .”); ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-5: INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 3
(2011) [hereinafter ACUS RECOMMENDATION] (“[T]he recommendation encourages agencies to take steps to promote the availability of incorporated materials within the framework of existing law.”).
166. See, e.g., Final Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, 81 Fed. Reg.
4673, at *6–7 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
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negotiate access to standards with SDOs or bend to their leverage, and may distribute incorporated standards freely when
adopted. Agencies encourage greater access to standards, so the
167
new provision will be aligned with that goal. Without the
provision, agencies will continue struggling to provide access to
incorporated standards by being prohibited from taking any ac168
tion that would violate the copyright.
The provision will also provide guidance to judges in future
cases. Judges show a reluctance to decide the copyright of incorporated standards because of the statutory shortcomings.
The opinions that have denied copyright to incorporated standards come off as unsure or unwilling to fully conclude the issue,
and even the opinions that have supported maintaining copyright have been vocal about courts being inappropriate for re169
solving the issue. A provision will provide clarity for future
170
courts addressing this issue.
inforeg/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_22.pdf; Incorporation by Reference, 79
Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,268, 66,270, 66,273–74 (Nov. 7, 2014) (to be codified at 1
C.F.R. pt. 51).
167. See, e.g., Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,271 (Nov.
7, 2014) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 51) (“OFR applauds all the efforts of these private organizations to make their [incorporated by reference] standards
available to the public. We encourage agencies and SDOs to continue to ensure
access to [incorporated by reference] standards.”).
168. See, e.g., Final Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, 81 Fed. Reg.
4673, at *21 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
inforeg/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_22.pdf (“If an agency incorporates by
reference material that is copyrighted . . . the agency should work with the
[SDO] to promote the availability of the materials . . . while respecting the
copyright owner’s interest . . . .” (emphasis added)); ACUS RECOMMENDATION,
supra note 165, at 5, § 3(b) (“If copyright owners do not consent to free publication of incorporated materials, agencies should work with them . . . [to] promote the availability of the materials while respecting the copyright owner’s
interest . . . .” (emphasis added)).
169. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (“The answer to this narrow issue seems compelled . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 807 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“It bears emphasis
that the Congress is best suited to accommodate its Congressionally-created
[sic] copyright protection.”); id. at 808 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“[I f ]irmly
believ[e] that for this court to be the first federal appellate court to go [this] far
is imprudent.”); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 410–11
(5th Cir. 2001) (stating earlier courts were wise not to conclude the issue);
Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 735 (1st Cir.
1980) (“While we do not rule finally on the question, we cannot say with any
confidence that the same policies applicable to statutes and judicial opinions
may not apply equally to regulations of this nature.”).
170. When the en banc Veeck decision was appealed to the Supreme Court,
the Court first invited the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief. S. Bldg.
Code Cong. Int’l, Inc. v. Veeck, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002). The Solicitor General
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Critics argue this provision is too drastic and would cause
171
great economic harm. But it is necessary to neutralize SDOs’
leverage. With a statutory change, the SDOs will not have the
option to holdout and deny their incorporated standards to
agencies, like some did with the Pipeline and Hazardous Mate172
rials Safety Administration (PHMSA). The Administrative
Conference even suggests that agencies reject SDOs that do not
173
compete and find competitors that will. In addition, even
without selling standards, the rewards of having a standard in174
corporated into law are still compelling. Standards develop175
ment is a highly competitive industry. If the economic incentives are as crucial to development as the SDOs urge, removing
just a portion of the potential revenue from incorporation
176
should increase competition among SDOs even more.
recommended denial of certiorari, advising that “[d]evelopment by the lower
courts . . . would further clarify the effect . . . that different government use[ ]
of copyrighted materials ha[s] on the copyright of those materials.” Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Veeck, 537 U.S. 1043 (No. 02-355)
[hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief ]. The Court denied hearing. S. Bldg. Code
Cong. Int’l, Inc. v. Veeck, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). This advice is flawed, because
the sums paid for access to standards are paltry compared to the cost of litigation. There is a reason that case law of this issue is so scarce, despite the existence of the issue for decades. SDOs appear to have priced their standards at
just the right point to be maximum lucrative while at the same time not overly
risking attention to the conflict. Waiting for the district and circuit courts to
ripen this issue is likely never going to happen, which makes reliance upon the
Supreme Court for a solution folly and misguided.
171. See Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 82–83 (statement of Patricia
Griffin, Vice President and General Counsel, ANSI) (arguing a “blanket” rule
would infringe upon too many considerations); Bremer, Multidimensional, supra note 26, at 10785 (stating such an approach is “simple, uncompromising,
and unworkable”).
172. See infra Part III.C.4 (discussing SDO leverage power on government
dependency).
173. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION, supra note 165, at 5, § 3(c) (“If more
than one standard is available to meet the agency’s need, it should consider
the availability of the standards as one factor in determining which standard
to use.”).
174. See infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text (discussing additional
benefits of enactment); supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the favorable position of
SDOs).
175. See Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 81 (statement of Patricia Griffin, Vice President and General Counsel, ANSI) (describing U.S. standardization as “[m]arket-driven and highly diversified”); cf. NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, AND TRADE: INTO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (1995) (stating excessive uniform standardization
reduces market choices, stifling manufacturer competition and innovation,
and perhaps eliminating any benefit to standards at all).
176. See infra Part III.C (discussing the economic dependency of selling
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Additionally, both commenters and the government warn
177
against the erosion of the “public-private partnership.” But to
them, the only “solution” that does not devalue the partnership
is the current one—where the public pays to read a legal obligation, gets sued for repeating it to a neighbor, SDOs leverage
178
power, and the government bends to their demands. That is
not a partnership. If the SDOs ceased to exist, the government
179
would still write standards. The institutional dependency on
SDO standards was only made possible from wrongly, but understandably, anticipating SDOs would not hold standards hos180
tage and charge for their access. Coupled with inflexible fiscal
pricing, it thus seems misplaced to portray the SDO role as so
charitable and egalitarian to be worthy of a “partnership” label.
Making a change that increases access to the law and minimizes leverage, while preserving benefits for SDO contribution,
would help foster a true partnership. Fortunately, a complete
copyright overhaul is not necessary to obtain this balance. Provisions that add laws to unprotected subject matter and expressly dictate treatment of copyrighted works that are volunteered into law will have an immediate, nation-wide impact on
improving access.
C. INCENTIVE AND THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING
THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
The constitutional purpose of copyright is anchored on incentivizing authors to cultivate benefits for society. Thus, in-

standards).
177. See Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,271 (Nov. 7,
2014) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 51) (“One [comment] stated that access is
important but shouldn’t undermine or dismantle the public-private partnership that currently exists . . . .”); ACUS RECOMMENDATION, supra note 165, at
2 (“Efforts to increase transparency . . . may conflict with . . . the significant
value of the public-private partnership in standards.”); Bremer, Open Age, supra note 16, at 156 (“[T]he public-private partnership . . . likely would be undermined by an overly aggressive approach.”).
178. ACUS RECOMMENDATION, supra note 165, at 5–6 (recommending
agencies continue to “work with” SDOs for availability); Bremer, Open Age,
supra note 16, at 156 (arguing a “collaborative solution” that merely mirrors
the status quo).
179. See Emily S. Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law,
63 U. KAN. L. REV. 279, 308 (2015) [hereinafter Bremer, On the Cost]
(“[I]ntegrat[ing] private standards into public law is not . . . [a] statutory requirement.”).
180. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 751 (“Congress . . .
clearly . . . [did not] anticipate[ ] that SDOs would . . . charge access fees.”).
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centive is repeatedly discussed throughout this Note’s analysis
because of its role in contrasting traditional lawmaking with
SDO authorship. This Note advocates for changes that would
reduce the financial-return incentives that are currently available to the owner of an incorporated standard. In defense of
proposed changes to the status quo, SDOs are quick to urge
that they are existentially dependent on maximizing the current opportunities for financial return. Since the government
relies almost exclusively on incorporated standards, this
doomsday warning provides SDOs tremendous leverage for
preventing changes that would hinder their dependency. While
it is true that SDOs do depend on revenues that their standards generate, there is a lot of hyperbole that distorts incentives and exaggerates SDOs economic reality. These changes
are not meant to put SDOs out of business or deprive them of
their works, but rather to establish a balance that allows both
the public to access legal obligations and SDOs to fairly reap
incentives for the valuable work they produce. This Section
hopes to place economic concerns into their correct perspective
and promote the balance of interests by showing that copyright’s purpose is not fulfilled by accrual of wealth, existing adverse changes have not diminished SDO efforts, and incentives
other than copyright protect against degradation of future
standard quality.
The most common argument advanced is that, unlike governments which are publicly funded, SDOs are non-profit organizations that depend on standard sales to finance future de181
Without control over reproduction and
velopments.
distribution, SDOs would suffer a drastic revenue reduction,
which would severely impede their standard development or

181. This Note assumes that the development costs are substantial. There
are some claims that, taken as a whole, might suggest development costs are
not as high as claimed. Compare OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546,
8554, § 4(a) (1998) (stating member-IP contributions to development are given
royalty-free), and MICHAEL B. SPRING & MARTIN B.H. WEISS, FINANCING THE
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 290 (1995) (“[E]ach [member] bears the
direct cost of participation of its experts.” (citation omitted)), and Why Charge
for Standards?, ANSI, https://www.ansi.org/help/help.aspx?menuid=15#
purchasing (last visited Nov. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Why Charge] (“[M]ost of
the people working on standards development are volunteers.”), with Scope
Hearings, supra note 22, at 83 (statement of Patricia Griffin, Vice President
and General Counsel, ANSI) (“The standardization community believes . . .
that the development . . . requires a massive investment of time, labor, expertise, and money.”).
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182

cease SDO existence entirely. After a shortage of SDO development, governments would likely be forced to draft their own
regulations and statutes, thereby draining limited time and resources. Consequently, this reduction of expertise would create
scattered variations of codes negating uniformity, safety, and
183
efficiency across the nation. These are reasonable concerns,
but they are not as drastic in reality.
1. Maximizing Wealth Is Not the Purpose of Copyright
The “ultimate aim” of copyright is “to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good,” and the possibility of financial return for that effort is just one of many benefits (exclusive control, lengthy duration, etc.) that copyright grants to
184
authors in furtherance of that aim. The absence or limitation
of any particular of these benefits does not necessarily defeat
the purpose of copyright. The copyright code does not state that
a financial gain must be preserved for copyright holders. Such a
provision would likely be surplusage since most copyrights do
185
not make money anyway. And despite the fact that SDOs
186
have thrived for decades on selling incorporated standards,
numerous statutory policy exceptions already exist that infringe upon the potential revenue of a valid copyright, such as
fair use, allowing libraries to reproduce for archives, and special reproductions for vision-impaired individuals, among oth-

182. Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 83 (statement of Patricia Griffin,
Vice President and General Counsel, ANSI); see Brendan Greeley, One Man’s
Quest To Make Information Free, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-12/one-mans-quest-to-make
-information-free (“This source of revenue gives us great independence.”).
183. Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 82–83 (statement of Patricia Griffin,
Vice President and General Counsel, ANSI).
184. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
Additional examples are the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, and
derivation, the ability to assign ownership, and life-time duration. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 106(a)–(c), 201(d), 302(a) (2012).
185. Mike Masnick, A Dozen Bad Ideas That Were Raised at the Copyright
Office’s DMCA Roundtables, TECHDIRT (May 18, 2016), https://www.techdirt
.com/articles/20160517/17541834469/dozen-bad-ideas-that-were-raised
-copyright-offices-dmca-roundtables.shtml (noting the substantial difficulty
content creators face when trying to monetize their works).
186. See David Halperin, Industry Groups Insist on Charging You $1,195
To Read a Public Law, REPUBLIC REP. (May 16, 2012), https://www
.republicreport.org/2012/industry-groups-charge-read-law (reporting that private organizations make “tens of millions of dollars annually” selling laws to
people).
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187

ers. Adding another exception that would decrease some of
the revenue potentially earned by the copyright would not violate any constitutional purpose. SDOs are allowed to make
money, not granted protection to guarantee the maximum possible revenue at all times. Such totalitarian control would undermine copyright’s policy emphasis on promoting communication and societal benefit.
2. Previous Adverse Changes in the Law Have Not Decreased
Economic Position
Existing adverse changes in the law have not impaired
188
SDO economic reality like predicted in the argument. Take
one example: the Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International decision handed down in 2002. At stake was an en
banc Fifth Circuit decision that rejected the copyright claims of
an SDO over their incorporated standards. In that case, some of
the largest SDOs filed amicus briefs all echoing the SDO defendant’s warning that their entity would diminish and their
developments shrivel should the Fifth Circuit rule in favor of
189
the plaintiff to limit the copyrights. The Fifth Circuit sided
with the plaintiff, and ten years later the SDO economic realities actually improved. For example, in 2002, pre-Veeck, the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reported $58.5
million in total revenue, with $36.4 million gross profit from
190
sales of inventory (includes law sales). It invested $9.7 million in code development, held $121 million in assets, paid its
executives over $2.7 million in salaries, and spent $13,000 on
191
lobbying. Contrast with 2012, post-Veeck, NFPA reported $69
million in total revenue, with $33.9 million in net inventory
192
sales income. It invested $12.5 million in code development,
187. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (limiting exclusive rights).
188. In its amicus curiae brief for the Veeck appeal, the Solicitor General
expressed serious skepticism and doubt about the economic predictions, stating they were “uncertain at best” and “such organizations have survived and
prospered despite the threat to their copyright income that has existed at least
since . . . 1980.” U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 1.
189. See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 796 n.6
(noting International Code Council amicus brief ); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong.
Int’l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 402 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting American National
Standards Institute, National Fire Protection Association, Underwriters Laboratories amici).
190. See Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, IRS FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX at ll. 12 & 102 (2002).
191. Id. at pt. III.b l. 59, pt. V sched. A, pt. IV-B l. i.
192. See Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, IRS FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION
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held $258 million in assets, paid executives $3.6 million in sal193
aries and bonuses, and spent $11,000 on lobbying. The argument’s negative effects were not realized, and indeed the NFPA
194
was not the only amicus to improve.
This flourishing is in part because of monopoly pricing
schemes used by the copyright holders for standards the public
195
is forced to purchase. Professor Peter Strauss highlighted a
196
perfect example: an FDA regulation requires the names of botanical ingredients in dietary supplements to be consistent with
197
a 1992 digital pdf-only text titled Herbs of Commerce. The
publisher, American Herbal Products Association (AHPA), also
offers an enhanced 2000 edition that is not incorporated into
law, described as “[a] must-have for anyone who writes about or
198
At the time of Professor
manufactures herbal products.”
Strauss’s publishing, the FDA-incorporated 1992 pdf-only copy
was $250 and the updated “must-have” edition went for only
199
$99.99. This is a pricing scheme designed to take full ad200
vantage of its mandated compliance in law.
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX at pt. I l. 12, pt. VIII l. 10c (2012).
193. Id. at pt. III l. 4b, pt. X l. 16, sched. J pt. II, sched. C pt. II-B.
194. Likewise, in 2002 the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
reported $17.3 million in total revenue, invested $11 million in code activities,
held $14.6 million in assets, and paid its executives over $1.8 million in salaries. See ANSI, IRS FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM
INCOME TAX at pt. I l. 12, pt. III ll. a-c, pt. IV l. 59, pt. V (2002). Contrast with
2012 ANSI reported $36.5 million in total revenue, invested $29 million in
code activities, held $18.7 million in assets, and paid its executives $4.98 million in compensation and bonuses. See ANSI, IRS FORM 990, RETURN OF
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX pt. I l. 12, pt. III l. 4e, pt. X l. 16,
sched. J pt. II (2012).
195. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 309
(2005) (“Monopoly pricing that copyright affords . . . .”); Mendelson, Private
Control, supra note 8, at 801 (“[Old] versions of SDO standards are sometimes
priced higher than current versions simply because a federal agency has elected to incorporate the older one by reference.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Strauss,
supra note 16, at 537–55 (alternatives to avoid SDO monopoly pricing). But see
Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 179, at 317–23 (analyzing the presence of
monopoly pricing in PHMSA standards).
196. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 509–10 (discussing the Herbs of Commerce editions).
197. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.4(h) (2016).
198. Strauss, supra note 16, at 509 (quoting Bookstore, AHPA, http://www
.ahpa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=357 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013)).
199. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 510. It appears the AHPA has finally
equalized the price of the 1992 PDF copy to $99.99. Perhaps because AHPA
has ramped up lobbying efforts to replace it, now “urg[ing the] FDA to modify
the rule to name the [2000] edition.” AHPA Generally Supports FDA’s Pro-
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This pricing opportunity raises a peculiar observation: it
suggests that the real value for an incorporated standard is not
in the copyright it retains, but is really acquired from being en201
acted into law. Consider the conditions surrounding a $99
purchase of a twenty-four year-outdated Herbs of Commerce
PDF file. If the purchase is made because of the copyright monopoly, then the purchase is made because the work is one-of-akind and no other substitute can be accepted (or replica created). This can be dismissed, because an improved version existed
for a lesser cost (now both equal in cost), yet there are purchases that still opt for the outdated version. If the purchase is
made because of it being enacted into law, then the purchase is
made because federal regulatory violations loom overhead of
anyone not willing to make the purchase. Thus, possessing exclusive control to a book that no one wants does not raise its
value—but getting that book enacted into law suddenly maximizes its value. Further, having a standard incorporated into law
bolsters the prestige and status of the developing organiza202
tion. This enables it to sell value-added products such as annotations, training, and certifications in addition to sales of the
203
standard. SDOs covet this position as evidenced by aggres204
sive lobby efforts, infringement lawsuits against SDO composed Rule, but Recommends Some Changes, AHPA (Aug. 18, 2014) [hereinafter AHPA], http://www.ahpa.org/News/LatestNews/tabid/96/ArtMID/1179/
ArticleID/374/Default.aspx.
200. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 801 (“The prices
SDOs currently charge for IBR standards are not ‘platonic’ in any sense or
even a function of the cost of production. [Adoption] of an SDO standard unquestionably increases the demand for it and, in turn, the likely income an
SDO will receive.” (footnote omitted)).
201. See Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 96 (statement of Carl Malamud,
President, Public.Resource.Org) (“[T]he goal . . . is precisely that their work
become law.”).
202. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 515 (“[IBR] . . . also confer[s] satisfying
prestige.”).
203. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 806 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (“SBCCI could easily publish them . . . with ‘value-added’ in
the form of commentary . . . and other information valuable to a reader.”);
Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 95 (statement of Carl Malamud, President,
Public.Resource.Org) (“The NFPA can, and does, sell all sorts of value-added
products”); cf. U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 18 (“[P]rofessionals . . .
may have ample incentive to continue to buy the ‘official’ sets of standards
notwithstanding the potential availability of other, unofficial editions.”).
204. Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 95 (statement of Carl Malamud,
President, Public.Resource.Org); see, e.g., Electrical Code Coalition Launches
Website, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N (June 11, 2013), http://www.nfpa.org/news
-and-research/news-and-media/press-room/news-releases/2013/electrical-code
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and glowing press releases boasting about new adop-

3. A Decrease in Revenue Will Not Decrease Quality of Future
Standards
The SDOs’ argument asserts that without capitalizing on
incorporated standards, future quality will deteriorate, thereby
making industries substantially less safe. But some argue that
the high quality of SDO standards is not a product of financial
incentive but borne out of self-interest, such as how an architect’s interest in his own building not collapsing on top of him
207
will incentivize him to produce a high quality building design.
Indeed, evidence supports this: for example, in the context
of federal regulation, of the 100,000 (including nonincorporated) SDO standards in use throughout the United
States, Emily Bremer estimates that only two to four percent

-coalition-launches-website (“[W]hich aims to facilitate direct and full adoption, application and uniform enforcement of the latest edition of . . . the National Electrical Code.”); AHPA, supra note 199 (AHPA “urging” FDA). But see
Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 750 (stating that marketability of
some standards rests on utility, not on the perceived benefits it were to bring
if enacted into law (citing Strauss, supra note 16, at 546)).
205. See Int’l Code Council v. Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, No. 02-C-5610, 2006
WL 850879, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (involving a major SDO alleging copyright
infringement against competitor SDO in its building code).
206. See, e.g., API Highlights Adoption of Industry Standards in Proposed
Well Control Rule, AM. PETROLEUM INST. (July 17, 2015), http://www.api.org/
news-policy-and-issues/news/2015/07/17/api-highlights-adoption-industry
-standar; see also Two UL Battery Safety Standards Are Now FDA Recognized
Consensus Standards for Medical Devices, UNDERWRITERS LAB. (July 21,
2014), http://ul.com/newsroom/pressreleases/two-ul-battery-safety-standards
-are-now-fda-recognized-consensus-standards-for-medical-devices.
207. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 806; 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.5.2, at 2:59 (3d ed. 2005) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine an area of
creative endeavor in which the copyright incentive is needed less.”); cf. Scope
Hearings, supra note 22, at 127 (statement of Darrell Issa, Rep. of Cal., member, S. Comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, & the Internet) (“The one
thing I know is I don’t need a copyright to promote politicians making laws.”).
In the software industry, this is known as “dogfooding,” whereby a company
produces a better product by forcing its use companywide. See Definition of
Dogfooding, PC MAG. ENCYCLOPEDIA (last visited Nov. 24, 2016),
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/56655/dogfooding; see, e.g., Brian
Bremner, The Bats Affair: When Machines Humiliate Their Masters,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012
-03-23/the-bats-affair-when-machines-humiliate-their-masters (recounting an
instance of a stock trading software developer launching its IPO on its own
software and failing because of poor software).
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208

are actually incorporated into federal law. At best, then, this
would represent 96,000 actively used standards that are not
earning the financial benefits of being enacted into law, either
by SDO choice to preclude the standard from incorporation or
by the government incorporating a competing standard instead.
In either case, it would be a stretch to suggest that the high development costs of the non-earning 96,000 standards were subsidized just on the revenue gained from the incorporated
209
4000. Thus, if the 96,000 non-incorporated standards were
not subsidized by the incorporated ones, something other than
financial gain incentivized their quality and development, making self-interest a probable explanation. In other words, SDOs
may invest time and resources into a standard they do not intend to profit from, but to invest in one that does not even keep
themselves safe is unlikely.
4. The Leverage Created by Government Reliance Stifles
Change
The argument reflects an overall reluctance and resistance
to change a business model that preys upon the consequences
of violating a legal obligation. Generally, when the government
modifies regulations, organizations must often change their
210
business model to adapt. SDOs, however, are quick to leverage government dependency to prevent any policy changes that
would disrupt their business model, and this leverage is outstanding.
In one instance, before Congress could investigate safety
violations in the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion, it first had
to absurdly track down copies of the oil pipeline standards that
were incorporated into the safety regulations—including one
which the American Petroleum Institute (API) demanded

208. Bremer, Multidimensional, supra note 26.
209. This is unlikely because of the “quite substantial” costs incurred in the
development process of every standard. SPRING & WEISS, supra note 181; see
also Why Charge, supra note 181 (detailing the costs of development, distribution, and administration).
210. See, e.g., Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama to Wall St.:
‘Join Us, Instead of Fighting Us,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2010), http://nyti.ms/
21tCWvF (discussing the effects Wall Street reform will have on banking
business models); Kathleen L. Brown, Like It or Not, Obamacare Is Reshaping
the Healthcare Industry, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
janetnovack/2014/10/07/like-it-or-not-obamacare-is-reshaping-the-healthcare
-industry (discussing how the Affordable Care Act has “radically alter[ed]
business models that hadn’t changed in decades”).
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211

$1195 from Congress to obtain. In response to the payment
demand, § 24 of the subsequent Pipeline Safety Act of 2011 ordered the PHMSA to no longer incorporate any SDO standards
unless they were “made available to the public, free of charge,
212
on an Internet Web site.” Shortly after, however, Congress
amended the section to remove the “on an Internet Web site”
213
restriction, to enable “greater flexibility in providing public
214
access to documents incorporated by reference.” Some critics
characterize this as Congress recognizing the restriction as too
limiting on the PHMSA because public safety demands agencies have the best standards as options (even if that means they
215
cannot read them). But this downplays the cause of the flexibility shortage—SDO leverage. The amendment’s House Report
makes no mention of needing to access the best standards. Instead, it states that the restriction was being lifted because
SDOs refused to act contrary to their closed-access business
216
models. This had the effect of shutting out the PHMSA from
standards, knowing that government dependency would force
217
Congress to neuter the statute.
The revenue gained from selling laws makes for a lucrative
business. But it is a business capitalizing on an unintended
situation. As private entities performing a public good there is
a sensitivity for preserving their efforts. Completely eliminat211. Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 788–89; Halperin, supra
note 186.
212. Pipeline Safety Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat. 1919, § 24
(2012) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 60102(p)).
213. Pub. L. No. 113-30, 127 Stat. 510 (2013).
214. H.R. REP. No. 113-152, pt. 1, at 4 (2013).
215. See Bremer, Multidimensional, supra note 26 (“An important consideration is the potential implications for public health and safety if an agency is
prohibited from using . . . technically superior, authoritative . . . private
standard[s].”). PHMSA was able to get seventy-eight percent of the standards
to comply. Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 179, at 326.
216. See H.R. REP. No. 113-152, pt. 1, at 3 (calling it “an unintended consequence”). This may not mean that all SDOs refused, but it would not have
taken much dissent to suffocate the PHMSA, as a mere three SDOs owned
seventy-three percent of PHMSA standards, with the other twenty-seven percent being owned by only eight more. Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 179, at
309–10. And indeed that was the case: agency dependency on a single 14,000
page standard that could not be substituted was enough to force a statutory
change. Id. at 327–28.
217. The Internet provision was the entire force of the statute, because the
standards have always been available to the public free of charge already—in
Washington, D.C. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 806
(“[P]roviding free access to IBR rules only in a Washington, D.C., reading
room.”).
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ing their earnings would be counter-productive, but this Note’s
approach only reduces a portion of their revenues. They will
maintain their positions in a competitive industry, with many
benefits and rewards still being obtained for adoption into law.
Their business models will need adjustment, but this is the nature of competition and regulation.
CONCLUSION
Federal agencies enact private standards into law using a
lawmaking technique called incorporation by reference. That
technique allows law makers to forego publishing the contents
of the standard inside of the law and merely refer to it by
name. Members of the public seeking to comply with the standard must then obtain it from the organization that authored it.
These private standards are copyrighted works and their owners accordingly charge license fees to access them. Concealing
and controlling access to society’s legal obligations creates significant due process issues that demand resolution.
Solutions that enable unrestricted access to the public are
difficult. Generally, traditional laws are precluded from copyright protection. However, the copyright statutes do not contain
any specific guidance for evaluating whether incorporated
standards maintain their copyright after subsequently becoming enacted into law. By statute, federal agencies are required
to utilize private standards and are barred from taking any action that would infringe their copyrights. Courts are hesitant to
invalidate copyrights where there is no express statutory authority to do so. Without any solution, the public pays millions
of dollars each year to the copyright owners in order to access
the standards and avoid blindly violating federal regulations or
218
being subject to infringement litigation.
The best solution is one that allows free, unrestricted access to the standards but preserves benefits to incentivize the
owners to develop future standards. This Note asserts making
two simple modifications to the Copyright Code. The first pro-

218. See Complaint, Am. Educ. Res. Ass’n, Inc. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,
No. 1:14-cv-00857 (D.D.C. May 23, 2014); Complaint, Am. Soc’y Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01215 (D. D.C. Aug. 6, 2013).
See generally Carl Malamud, Pulled over for Copying U.S. Federal Law: Do
You Have a License and Registration for That Law?, HARV. L. REC. (Feb. 2,
2015),
http://hlrecord.org/2015/02/pulled-over-for-copying-u-s-federal-law-do
-you-have-a-license-and-registration-for-that-law (discussing recent infringement litigation).
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vision adds the concept of laws to the subject matter exclusions
of § 102(b). The second provision specifically places copyrighted
works that receive legal effect into the public domain. Because
of the copyright, agencies may only incorporate standards that
are voluntarily offered by owners. And since there are numerous benefits—besides coerced sales—that incorporated standard owners may receive, these provisions work in tandem to
strike a balance that keeps legal obligations unrestricted while
maintaining incentives for future standard authors.

